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Abstract:  An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated 
products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject 
to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using 
product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992-2003, we 
find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy 
between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by 
the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show 
that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for 
homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.6% increase 
in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 2.1% increase in the case of differentiated 
products. Finally, the data indicate that greater tariff evasion observed for differentiated products tends to 
take place through misrepresentation of the import prices. 
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As many developing and transition countries rely on import tariffs as an important source of 
revenue,
1 evasion of customs duties has attracted a lot of attention from policy makers. For instance, a 
report released by the state’s budgetary watchdog, the Audit Chamber, found that the Russian customs 
service was plagued by corruption which was costing the state billions of dollars annually (Baumgartner, 
2001). An investigation by the Supreme Board of Inspection (NIK) in Poland suggested that importers 
used various methods to artificially lower the value of imported goods, including fake invoices and 
double invoicing (Polish News Bulletin, 2000). Revenue loss aside, there are other undesirable effects of 
tariff evasion. It boosts the profitability of well-connected firms at the expense of honest producers and 
importers. It may hinder the accession process to the World Trade Organization and hurt the image of the 
country as an attractive location for foreign direct investment. 
The purpose of this study is to enhance our understanding of tariff evasion—concealment of 
dutiable imports by private parties (individuals or private firms). It aims to do so in three ways. First, it 
documents the existence of tariff evasion in transition countries by demonstrating that in 8 out of 10 
Eastern European economies, the discrepancy between the export figures reported by Germany and the 
import data recorded by the importing economy is systematically related to the tariff level.
2 In this way, it 
shows the generality of the pattern found for China by Fisman and Wei (2004). It also improves on 
Fisman and Wei’s work by relying on panel data rather than mostly cross-sectional information. Second, 
it finds that tariff evasion is more prevalent for differentiated products, as defined by Rauch (1999). This 
result is intuitive as it is more difficult to accurately assess the price of differentiated products, which 
means that honest customs officers find it more difficult to detect an invoice stating an incorrect price and 
corrupt customs officers have a plausible explanation for why they did not detect the problem with the 
invoice.
3 Third, the study shows that tariff evasion in the case of differentiated product tends to take place 
by misrepresenting the price of imported goods rather than by undercounting physical quantities or 
misclassifying products. 
                                                 
1 Customs and other import duties accounted for 62% of tax revenue in the Maldives, 55% in Lesotho, 50% in 
Madagascar,  42% in Bangladesh, 16% in Tajikistan and 10% in Ukraine (2004 figures from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators). 
2 Note that while some discrepancy in trade data may be due to lower quality of data recording in Eastern European 
countries, in the absence of evasion such discrepancy would not be systematically related to the tariff rate. 
3 An investigation into customs import control launched by the Polish Supreme Board of Inspection showed that the 
value of imported goods, as included in customs declarations, was often “ridiculously low,” which went unnoticed 
by customs officers. Importers used various methods to artificially lower the value of imported goods, including 
fake invoices issued by both foreign suppliers and the importers or double invoicing. In most such cases, according 
to the NIK report, customs officers either did not want or were unable to question the evident misrepresentation of 
prices. The verification of customs value of imported goods during customs clearance procedures was in most cases 
carried out according to the sole discretion of the customs officers on duty (Polish News Bulletin, 2000).    3
Eastern Europe is a suitable environment for this study for three reasons. First, the weakness of its 
institutions, including the customs service, makes it prone to tariff evasion. For instance, in a 1999 survey 
51% of firms in Romania, 45% in Lithuania and 44% in Ukraine believed that there was a need to make 
“additional payments” when dealing with customs.
4 Second, trade liberalization taking place during the 
period under study gives us a significant variation in tariff rates across time and across products. As 
illustrated in Table A1 in Appendix I, during the period under study the average tariff rate in Poland 
declined from 11.8% to 1.9%. The corresponding figures for Hungary were 12.9% and 5.6%, while for 
Russia the change was from 12.1% to 10.4%. Third, as all but two of the countries in the sample were 
preparing for their accession to the European Union during the time under study, the changes in their 
tariff rates were determined by the pre-accession agreements (European Agreements) and thus are not 
subject to endogeneity problems. 
Taking Fisman and Wei’s work as our starting point, we analyze the sensitivity of tariff evasion 
to tariff rates and identify the type of products which are subject to greater evasion. We use data on ten 
Eastern European countries over the time period 1992-2003. We measure the trade gap as the difference 
between the value of exports from Germany to each country in the sample as reported by Germany and 
the value of imports from Germany as reported by each importing country. Considering the same trading 
partner for all importers in the sample ensures that the export data are measured consistently. We choose 
to focus on German exports, as Germany was a major trading partner of all countries in the sample 
accounting for 31% of total imports in the Czech Republic, a quarter of imports in both Hungary and 
Poland and 19% in Slovenia. The lowest share of German imports was registered in Ukraine where they 
accounted for only 9% of the total (see Table A2 in Appendix I). The trade figures come from the United 
Nations’ COMTRADE database and are available at the product level (6-digit category in the 
Harmonized System (HS) classification HS1988/92). Depending on the country, our data set includes 
information on between 1,433 and 2,785 products for years between 1992 and 2003. The tariff data, 
applied by each importing country to imports from Germany, measured also at the 6-digit HS level, have 
been obtained from the UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. 
We find a positive and significant relationship between the tariff level and the trade gap. This 
relationship holds for 8 out of 10 countries as well as for the pooled sample. It is robust to including 6-
digit product dummies and country-year fixed effects. The responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff 
level is found to be the highest for Ukraine and the Russian Federation, both of which appear to have a 
                                                 
4 The data come from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), conducted jointly by 
the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The statistics pertain to the 
percentage of firms which answered “always,” “mostly,” “frequently,” “sometimes” or “seldom” to the question 
“How frequently do firms in your line of business have to pay some irregular "additional payments" to deal with 
customs and imports?”   4
high level of corruption in the customs service according to the BEEPS survey mentioned earlier. It is 
also interesting to note that no statistically significant relationship is found for Slovenia which is the 
country with the lowest incidence of customs corruption as reported in BEEPS.  
In addition to testing the relationship between tariff levels and evasion, we ask what kind of 
products are more likely to be subject to evasion. We consider Rauch’s (1999) definition of differentiated 
products and argue that for such products it may be easier to conceal their true value. We confirm our 
hypothesis by showing that the trade gap is more responsive to the tariff level in the case of differentiated 
goods than in the case of homogeneous products. This result holds for both a liberal and a conservative 
definition of differentiated products and is robust to several specifications. The magnitude of the effect is 
economically meaningful. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.6% 
increase in trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 2.1% increase in the case of 
differentiated products. 
Finally, we consider three channels through which tariff evasion may take place. These are: (i) 
misrepresenting the price of imported products; (ii) undercounting physical quantities of imported 
products, and (iii) misclassification of high tariff products as a lower tariff variety. We find strong 
evidence of price misrepresentation in the case of differentiated products. More specifically, our results 
indicate that the gap in the unit values of exports reported by Germany and imports reported by the 
destination country (which captures reporting a lower than actual price of imports) is positively correlated 
with the tariff level. This effect is positive and statistically significant in the case of differentiated 
products, but not for all other goods. We find little evidence of undercounting of physical quantities. 
Neither do we find evidence of product misclassification when we consider misclassification within the 
same 4-digit HS sector. We conclude that the difficulties associated with assessing the price of 
differentiated products make them particularly prone to tariff evasion. 
Our study is related to the literature documenting evasion of import duties in developing 
countries. In their 1970 volume, Little, Scitovsky and Scott pointed out that evasion of import duties 
through smuggling was a major problem in Mexico, Argentina and the Philippines. Bhagwati (1964) 
discussed the prevalence of under-invoicing as a method of tariff evasion. The type of corruption that 
involved import duty evasion in which briber and bribee collude to rob the public was referred by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) as “corruption with theft.” Pritchett and Sethi (1994) examined the data from three 
developing countries (Jamaica, Kenya and Pakistan) and found that collected and official tariff rates are 
only weakly related, the variance of the collected rate increases strongly with the level of the official rate 
and the collected rate increases much less than one-for-one with increases in the official rate. The 
relationship between evasion and tariff rates was analyzed by Fisman and Wei (2004) who found that 
import duty evasion rises with the tariff rate. Comparing the values of imports from Hong Kong as   5
reported by China with the Hong Kong data on its exports to China at the product level for 1998 they 
demonstrated that a one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate was on average associated with a three 
percent increase in underreporting.
5 
Our study also contributes to the emerging literature on differentiated products. In his seminal 
work, Rauch (1999) classified goods into three categories. He defined homogeneous goods as products 
whose price is set on organized exchanges. Goods which are not traded on organized exchanges, but 
possess a benchmark price, were defined as reference priced. Finally, products whose price is not set on 
organized exchanges and which lack a reference price because of their intrinsic features were labeled as 
differentiated. Rauch argued that search costs tend to be higher for differentiated products relative to 
homogeneous goods and showed that colonial ties and common language are more relevant for trade in 
differentiated products than trade in homogeneous goods. In subsequent work, Rauch and Trinidade 
(2002) found that the positive impact of ethnic Chinese networks on bilateral trade is greater for 
differentiated products relative to homogeneous ones. In line with this result, Rauch and Casella (2003) 
showed that the higher the degree of product differentiation the larger the impact of international ties 
between wholesalers on bilateral trade. Fink, Mattoo and Neaugu (2002) provided evidence that the effect 
of communication costs on trade is larger for differentiated products. Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001) 
showed that home market effects are more pronounced for differentiated than for homogeneous products, 
while Evans (2003) found that the higher the degree of product differentiation, the smaller the border 
effects. In a recent paper, Besedes and Prusa (2006) showed that transactions in differentiated goods tend 
to start involving smaller values than transactions of homogeneous goods and that trade relationships tend 
to be longer for differentiated products than for homogeneous ones.  
While our study does not explicitly analyze the effects of customs reform, its results suggest that 
a system which gives customs officials discretion and does not involve effective audits or secondary 
inspections is likely to lead to tariff evasion. Corrupt behavior aside, the ability of the customs official to 
evaluate invoice prices may be greatly enhanced by computerization and international agreements that 
allow them to obtain verification from foreign institutions about the validity of documents presented by 
                                                 
5 Our work is also related to a more general literature on tax evasion. While many theoretical models have analyzed 
the impact of tax rates on evasion, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) concluded in their survey paper that theoretical 
findings are not clear-cut, as they strongly depend on modeling assumptions. Contrasting results are provided by 
empirical studies as well. Clotfelter (1983) and Feinstein (1991), who study the impact of tax rates on tax evasion by 
using the U.S. Taxpayers Compliance Measurement Program data, ended up drawing opposite conclusions. 
Cloetfleter found a positive relationship, while Feinstein, who employed a subset of the dataset, provided evidence 
of a negative relationship.   6
importers. Our results also provide evidence in favor of having a uniform tariff structure which would 
dampen the incentives to misclassify imported products.
6 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 explores the 
relationship between tariff rates and evasion. Section 4 presents the empirical results on tariff evasion for 
differentiated products, and Section 5 examines the channels through which such evasion takes place. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. Data 
Our first data source is the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. This 
database contains information on MFN and preferential tariff rates specific to pairs of countries and years, 
derived from the UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS). The tariff information 
is available at the 6-digit Harmonized System level. We focus on 8 Eastern European countries acceding 
to the European Union (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia) as well as on the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
7 As most of these countries have preferential 
trade agreements with the European Union, we use information on applied tariffs.  
As illustrated in Table 1, tariff rates differ substantially across the countries considered. Lithuania 
has the lowest average tariff rate of 3.64%, as a large percentage of products are subject to zero tariff, 
while Russian Federation shows the highest average tariff rate of 12.58%. Slovenia is the country with the 
lowest maximum tariff rate, around 49%. A large fraction of imports is not taxed in Poland, although the 
variance in Polish tariffs is very high, due to the high tariff rates applied to tobacco imports (up to 295%). 
It is relevant to note that all countries in the sample undertook trade liberalization during the time period 
under study and their tariff rates decreased significantly over time (see Table A1 in Appendix I).  
Our second data source is the United Nations’ COMTRADE database which includes information 
on trade flows, also at the 6-digit level. The data on tariffs and trade flows are available for the period 
1992-2003, though the coverage differs by country (see Appendix I for more details). Using 
COMTRADE data we calculate the trade gap, which is defined as the log difference between the value of 
exports from Germany to each country in the sample as reported by Germany and the value of imports 
from Germany as reported by each partner country.  
                                                 
6 The theoretical arguments in favor of a uniform tariff structure are usually based on political economy 
considerations and incentives for tariff evasion (see Panagariya and Rodrik 1993; Tarr 2002; Anderson and Neary 
2006). 
7 Data constraints prevent us from including other post-Soviet transition countries in the sample. Unfortunately, 
WITS does not include ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs which may be prevalent in the countries not 
acceding to the EU. However, not controlling for specific tariffs is likely to work against us finding a relationship 
between trade evasion and tariff level. As specific tariffs are more likely to be imposed on agricultural products, in 
our robustness checks we will exclude these products from the sample.   7
As can be seen in the lower panel of Table 1, there are significant differences in the trade gap 
across countries. A discrepancy between the value of exports recorded by the exporting country and the 
value of imports recorded by the importer is to be expected. The first reason is that export prices are 
expressed in f.o.b. terms while imports are recorded including the cost of insurance and freight (c.i.f.). 
The second reason is that countries tend to monitor imports more carefully than exports. Thus, in the 
absence of tariff evasion one would expect the discrepancy to be negative. And indeed the reported value 
of imports exceeds that of exports in 6 out of 10 countries. The largest difference is observed in Latvia, 
Russia and Ukraine, which are located farther away from Germany than Poland, the Czech Republic or 
Hungary and thus their imports may need to incur higher transport costs. However, as illustrated in Table 
1, in 4 out of 10 countries we observe a positive gap which means that on average Germany recorded 
higher exports of a particular product line than the imports recorded by a transition country. The extent of 
underreporting (i.e., the positive gap) ranges from 6% in the case of Hungary to 12% in Bulgaria, 14% in 
the Czech Republic and 16% in Slovenia.
8  
 
Table 1: Tariff rates and trade gap by country.   
   Tariff rates 
Country 
Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum Maximum  Obs. 
          
Bulgaria 3.96  7.18  0  68  3,453 
Czech Republic  4.26  6.44  0  168  16,187 
Hungary   8.50  11.72  0  150  22,725 
Latvia 4.51  7.65  0  88  13,122 
Lithuania 3.64  7.45  0  70  10,284 
Poland 5.19  13.79  0  295  17,817 
Romania 7.23  9.20  0  144  9,874 
Russian Federation  12.58  7.80  0  100  16,575 
Slovenia 6.78  7.23  0  49.2  10,546 
Ukraine 8.85  8.98  0  70  11,825 
          
   Trade gap 
Country 
Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum Maximum  Obs. 
          
Bulgaria 0.11  1.20  -6.24  7.58  3,453 
Czech Republic  0.13  1.10  -7.28  8.04  16,187 
Hungary   0.06  1.31  -7.39  8.23  22,725 
Latvia -5.96  2.72  -14.65  6.50  13,122 
Lithuania -0.08  1.23  -7.14  8.47  10,284 
Poland -0.41  2.05  -10.40  6.47  17,817 
Romania -0.01  1.30  -7.40  7.52  9,874 
                                                 
8 Note that these percentages are calculated as the exponent of the values reported in Table 1.   8
Russian Federation  -5.45 2.98  -15.51  9.41  16,575 
Slovenia 0.15  1.33  -7.17  8.90  10,546 
Ukraine -2.88  3.85  -14.05  7.56  11,825 
Notes: trade gap = ln(exports reported by Germany)pt – ln(imports reported by the 
importing country)pt where p stands for a 6-digit HS product and t for year. 
 
3. Tariff rates and Trade gap 
It is reasonable to expect that the incentive of importers to evade import duties increases with the 
tariff rate. And indeed Fisman and Wei (2004) find a positive relationship between the trade gap and the 
tariff rate in China. But does this relationship hold in other countries or are Chinese importers unique in 
their ability to conceal imports? As many transition countries had significantly lower tariffs than the 
average rate of 17.6% imposed by China on imports from Hong Kong in 1998, the year considered by 
Fisman and Wei, does the relationship between evasion and tariff level hold in transition economies?  
 
Table 2: Trade gap by tariff rate.       
Country Trade  Gap 
  Tariff below median   Tariff above median  Difference 
  (1)  (2)  (2) - (1) 
0.00 0.23  0.23  Bulgaria 
(1751 products)  (1702 products)   
      
0.09 0.19  0.10  Czech Republic 
(9874 products)  (6313 products)   
      
-0.03 0.15  0.18  Hungary  
(11663 products)  (11062 products)   
      
-6.05 -5.82  0.24  Latvia 
(8126 products)  (4996 products)   
      
-0.12 0.03  0.15  Lithuania 
(7510 products)  (2774 products)   
      
-0.25 -0.80  -0.55  Poland 
(12888 products)  (4929 products)   
      
-0.08 0.09  0.17  Romania 
(6002 products)  (3872 products)   
      
-5.60 -5.24  0.36  Russian Federation 
(9815 products)  (6760 products)   
      
0.14 0.16  0.01  Slovenia 
(7829 products)  (2717 products)   
      
-3.16 -2.48  0.68 
Ukraine 
(6996 products)  (4829 products)      9
Notes: trade gap = ln(exports reported by Germany)pt – ln(imports reported by the 
importing country)pt where p stands for a 6-digit HS product and t for year. The 
median tariff values are calculated for each country and each year. 
 
To shed some light on these questions, we start by presenting simple summary statistics of the 
trade gap for each country in our sample. In each country, we split the products into those with the tariff 
above the median rate and those with the tariff below the median (Table 2). In all countries, except for 
Poland, the trade gap is higher for products whose tariffs are above the median. For instance, while in 
Bulgaria there is no trade gap for products with low protection, in the case of goods with above median 
tariff rate the discrepancy increases to 26%. In Hungary, the value of exports of products with a below 
median tariff rate is 3% lower than the value of imports, but in the case of above median tariff rates, 
exports are underreported by 16%. These summary statistics are consistent with the idea that the gap 
value is a proxy for tariff evasion. We obtain similar results when we split the sample between products 
with the top 25% tariff rates versus the rest. The puzzling result regarding Poland may be explained by 
the high percentage of products subject to zero tariffs. The percentage of products exempt from tariffs 
increased from 12% in 1998 to 89% in 1999 and remained well above 90% in the following years. 
Next we estimate a simple model of the trade gap as a function of the tariff rate and year fixed 
effects. We do so for each country c in the sample separately. 
cpt t cpt cpt cpt cpt Germany tariff gap trade value port value Export ε α β α + + + = = − _ _ Im ln _ ln ,  
where p stands for a 6-digit product and t for year. Our prior is that if the gap value is a good proxy for 
tariff evasion then the estimated coefficient of the tariff rate should be positive and significant.  
The results, reported in Table 3, are consistent with the summary statistics presented earlier. The 
estimated coefficient on the tariff rate is positive and significant at the 1% level for all the countries but 
Slovenia and Poland. The higher the tariff rate, the lower the value of imports reported by the importing 
country relative to the reported exports (i.e, the higher the trade gap). A one-percentage-point increase in 
the tariff level is associated with a 4.4% increase in the trade gap in Ukraine, 3.2% increase in the Russian 
Federation and 0.8% increase in Hungary. These results are in line with Fisman and Wei’s study which 
finds a 3% increase.
9  
It is interesting to note that Ukraine, the country with the highest estimated elasticity, has the 
second highest prevalence of corruption in customs as reported in the BEEPS survey. Slovenia, a country 
for which there is no statistically significant relationship, is ranked as the cleanest country in terms of 
corruption in customs according to BEEPS. See Appendix II for more details. The insignificant 
                                                 
9 Note that these calculations do not take into account the direct effect an increase in a tariff rate may have on the 
volume of imports.   10
coefficient found in the case of Poland is likely to be driven by the high percentage of products which are 
subject to zero tariff.   11
 
Table 3: Trade gap and tariff rate by country. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 Bulgaria  Czech 
Republic  Hungary Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania Russia  Slovenia Ukraine 
   Trade Gap 
            
Tariff  0.009 0.015 0.008 0.022 0.013 0.000 0.01  0.032 -0.004  0.044 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)  (0.005)*** 
            
Observations  3453  16187 22725 13122 10284 17817 9874  16575 10546 11825 
Adj.  R-squared  0.004 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.674 0.005 0.011 0.0001  0.011 
All models include year fixed effect and a constant. Standard errors, clustered on 6-digit products, are listed in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
4. Trade gap, tariff rates and differentiated products 
As mentioned earlier, differentiated products may lend themselves more readily to tariff evasion 
than homogeneous goods as their price depends on many attributes some of which may not be easily 
verifiable by a person unfamiliar with the product. Therefore, in the case of differentiated products it is 
more difficult for honest customs officers to detect an invoice stating an incorrect price and corrupt 
customs officers have a plausible explanation for why they failed to detect the problem with the invoice. 
In our analysis, we use the classification of differentiated products developed by Rauch (1999). 
Rauch defined differentiated products as those not having a reference price or those whose price is not 
quoted on organized exchanges. Wheat and diamonds are classified as homogeneous goods, while coats 
and jackets are considered to be differentiated products. Rauch suggested two definitions, a conservative 
and a liberal one, in order to account for the ambiguities arising in the classification. The conservative 
definition minimizes the number of commodities that are classified as homogeneous goods, while the 
liberal definition maximizes this number. We employ both classifications, although the results do not 
differ substantially between the two. Rauch’s definitions are based on the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 
classification, and we use the concordance provided by WITS to make it compatible with the 6-digit HS 
1988/92 classification used in our data set. 
Table 4, which reports the average trade gap for differentiated and homogeneous goods, confirms 
our prior about differentiated products lending themselves more readily to tariff evasion. For all countries 
but Latvia and the Czech Republic, the trade gap is larger for differentiated products than for 
homogeneous goods. For instance in Bulgaria, there is hardly any discrepancy for homogeneous products 
(-2.6% in the case of the conservative and -1.6% in the case of the liberal definition), but a significant 
trade gap is found for differentiated products (16.6% and 17.6% for the conservative and liberal 
definition, respectively). In the case of Hungary, the gap increases from 3% for homogeneous goods to   12
6.7% for differentiated products when the conservative definition is used. The corresponding figures for 




Note that the upper panel in Table 4 indicates that for 7 out of 10 countries in the sample, the 
tariff rate on differentiated products is lower than the tariff rate on homogeneous goods. This allows us to 
have some confidence that the reported differences in trade gap between differentiated and homogeneous 
products are likely to be driven by evasion rather than differences in tariff rates. 
To test whether differentiated products are more likely to be subject to underreporting, we pool 
all countries in the sample and regress the trade gap on the tariff rate, the differentiated product dummy 
Table 4: Average tariff rates and trade gap by type of product. 
   Tariff rate 
 Homogeneous  Differentiated     Homogeneous  Differentiated 
 Conservative    Liberal 
          
Bulgaria 6.352  3.277    5.592  3.359 
Czech Republic  4.953  3.965    4.726  4.012 
Hungary   10.753  7.725    10.254  7.736 
Latvia 5.256  4.331    4.938  4.375 
Lithuania 4.381  3.447    3.603  3.651 
Poland 8.671  4.132    7.811  4.132 
Romania 9.858  6.372    8.937  6.513 
Russian Federation  9.222  13.717    10.120  13.655 
Slovenia 5.674  7.168    5.575  7.320 
Ukraine 7.878  9.096    7.763  9.211 
                 
   Trade Gap 
 Homogeneous  Differentiated     Homogeneous  Differentiated 
 Conservative    Liberal 
          
Bulgaria -0.026  0.154    -0.016  0.162 
Czech Republic  0.141  0.125    0.115  0.138 
Hungary   0.030  0.065    0.022  0.071 
Latvia -5.906  -5.978    -5.937  -5.973 
Lithuania -0.222  -0.043    -0.210  -0.036 
Poland -0.466  -0.388    -0.473  -0.379 
Romania -0.060  0.005    -0.076  0.016 
Russian Federation  -5.712  -5.366    -5.717  -5.338 
Slovenia 0.114  0.157    0.108  0.163 
Ukraine -2.949  -2.869    -2.951  -2.863 
Notes: trade gap = ln(exports reported by Germany)pt – ln(imports reported by the importing country)pt 
where p stands for a 6-digit HS product and t for year.   13
and the interaction between the tariff rate and the differentiated product dummy. Our specification is as 
follows: 
cpt ct p cpt
p cpt cpt
product ated differenti tariff










where  cpt gap trade_  is the gap value for the country c importing product p at time t; tariffcpt is the tariff 
rate imposed by country c on imports of product p from Germany at time t,  p product ated differenti _  is 
the differentiated product dummy based on Rauch’s conservative or liberal definition, depending on the 
specification. To control for importing country-specific changes that may occur in a particular time 
period, such as a reform of the customs service or a decline in the incidence of corruption, we include 
country-year fixed effects. Thus to the extent that the introduction of computerization or an increase of 
salaries in the customs service affects tariff evasion across the board, it will be captured by these fixed 
effects. Finally, we cluster standard errors at the 6-digit product level. 
In line with the evidence shown in the previous section, we expect the estimated coefficient for 
the tariff rate to be positive and significant. The higher the tariff rate, the higher the incentive for tax 
evasion, and the higher the expected gap. We are, however, primarily interested in the interaction 
between the tariff rate and the differentiated product dummy. Our prior is that the effect of the tax rate is 
higher for differentiated products relative to homogeneous ones. This is because differentiated product 
may make it easier for importers or corrupt customs officials to misrepresent the price of the imports. 
Classifying homogeneous goods is relatively straightforward and there is little variation in prices, thus 
misrepresenting the price could easily be detected. With differentiated products the wide range of 
potential uses, product characteristics and quality levels make the assessment of price more difficult, thus 
creating more room for tax evasion. Therefore, we expect the estimated coefficient  3 β  to be positive. 
The results, reported in Table 5, support our hypothesis that the positive relationship between the 
tariff rate and trade evasion is stronger for differentiated products. In the first column of Table 5, we 
confirm that the positive correlation between tariff levels and the trade gap holds in the pooled sample. In 
the second column, we employ the conservative definition of differentiated products and find that the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level. This finding 
confirms our prior that the response of tariff evasion to the tariff rate is higher for differentiated products. 
Note that the differentiated product dummy itself is not significant suggesting that differentiated products 
differ in terms of the trade gap response to the tariff level but not in terms of the trade gap in general. As 
in the country regressions, the tariff coefficient remains positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that an increase in the tariff rate leads to an increase in the gap value, and hence to an increase in the 
evasion and underreporting of imports. The results hold when we consider the liberal definition of   14
differentiated products (see column 3). Again, the responsiveness of evasion to an increase in the tariff 
rate is greater for differentiated products. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect is economically meaningful. A one-
percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.6% increase in evasion in the case of 
homogeneous products and a 2.1% increase in the case of differentiated products
10. 
A potential concern is that our results may be driven by agricultural products which are 
homogeneous in nature and may be subject to non-tariff barriers. To check this possibility, in columns 4-6 
we replicate the previous specifications excluding agricultural products (HS codes 010111 to 530599). 
The same results hold: the estimated coefficient of the tariff rate is still positive and statistically 
significant. Similarly, the interaction term between the tariff rate and the differentiated product dummy, 





                                                 
10 These magnitudes refer to the specification in column 2.   15
 
Table 5: Trade, tariff rates and differentiated products. 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trade Gap 
          
Tariff  0.012  0.006 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.006 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
         
Tariff*Conservative     0.015     0.016   
dummy    (0.002)***     (0.002)***   
          
Tariff*Liberal dummy      0.014    0.015 
     (0.002)***    (0.002)*** 
         
Conservative dummy    -0.009     0.009   
    (0.03)     (0.032)   
         
Liberal dummy      0.015    0.032 
     (0.029)    (0.03) 
         
Agricultural  products  Included  Included Included Excluded  Excluded  Excluded 
         
Observations  132408  132408 132408 127893 127893 127893 
Adjusted R-squared  0.59  0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
All regressions include country-year fixed effects and a constant. Standard errors, clustered on 6-digit product, are 
listed in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
As a robustness check, we introduce country-year fixed effects together with 6-digit product fixed 
effects thus controlling for country-specific changes in the performance of the customs service as well as 
unobservable product characteristics (see Table 6). The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is 
still positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications, both with and without 
agricultural products and both for the liberal and the conservative definition of differentiated products. 
The estimated elasticity of the trade gap with respect to the tariff rate is positive and significant in 4 out of 
6 specifications. 
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Table 6: Trade gap, tariff rates and differentiated products. Controlling for country-year fixed effects 
and 6-digit product fixed effects.             
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trade Gap 
        
Tariff  0.008 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.002 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)**  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)  (0.001) 
        
Tariff*Conservative     0.013    0.014   
Dummy   (0.002)***    (0.002)***   
        
Tariff*Liberal       0.012    0.013 
Dummy     (0.002)***    (0.002)*** 
        
Agricultural  products  Included Included Included Excluded  Excluded  Excluded 
        
Observations  132408 132408 132408 127893 127893 127893 
Adjusted R-squared  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
All regressions include country-year and 6-digit product fixed effects as well as a constant. Robust standard 
errors are listed in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
As another robustness check, we estimate a model in first differences. This will allow us to 
eliminate the time-invariant effects specific to a particular product imported by a particular country. To 
control for importing country-specific time trends, e.g., an improvement in the quality of the customs 
services over time, we include importing-country fixed effects. Our estimating equation takes the 
following form:  
cpt c p cpt cpt cpt dummy ated differenti tariff tariff gap trade ε λ γ γ γ + + Δ + Δ + = Δ _ * _ 2 1 0  
Again, the estimation results confirm our earlier findings (see Table 7). The interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant for both the liberal and the conservative definition of differentiated 
products. The coefficient on tariff level, however, loses its significance.   17
 
 
Table 7: Trade gap, tariff rates and differentiated products. Specification in first differences. 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Δ Trade Gap 
         
Δ  Tariff  0.001  -0.005 -0.004 0.002  -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
         
Δ Tariff*Conservative dummy    0.012     0.010   
   (0.005)**     (0.005)*   
         
Δ Tariff*Liberal dummy      0.010      0.008 
     (0.005)**      (0.005)* 
         
Agriculture  Included  Included Included Excluded  Excluded  Excluded 
         
Observations  102989  102989 102989 99883  99883  99883 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0003  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
All regressions include country fixed effects and a constant. Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
5. Channels of tariff evasion 
In the light of the above findings, it is natural to ask how tariff evasion takes place. There are 
three potential channels through which importers may attempt to avoid or minimize the tariff payment: (i) 
misrepresenting the price of imported products; (ii) undercounting physical quantities of imported 
products, and (iii) misclassification of high tariff products as a lower tariff variety. In this section, we 
explore each of these evasion methods. 
 
5.1 Misrepresenting the price of imported products 
To examine the prevalence of misrepresenting the price of imports, we calculate the difference 
between the unit value of exports reported by Germany and the unit value of imports recorded by the 


















gap value − =  
As before, the gap is calculated at the level of 6-digit HS product for each importing country and each 
year. 
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Table 8: Unit value gap. Homogeneous versus differentiated products.  
   Homogeneous  Differentiated  Homogeneous  Differentiated 
  
Mean   St. Dev 
Conservative Liberal 
                  
Bulgaria 0.29  1.06  -0.146  0.417  -0.120  0.445 
Czech  Republic 0.21  0.80  0.021  0.288 0.036 0.301 
Hungary   0.18  0.84  0.006  0.246  0.013  0.260 
Latvia -5.83  2.44  -5.920 -5.803  -5.920  -5.795 
Lithuania 0.23  0.91  -0.027 0.312 0.004 0.323 
Poland -0.37  1.97  -0.495  -0.329  -0.457  -0.332 
Romania 0.33  1.05  0.018  0.448  0.034  0.472 
Russian Federation  -5.25  2.72 -5.524  -5.160  -5.524  -5.133 
Slovenia 0.14  0.86  -0.146 0.235  -0.129  0.256 
Ukraine -2.78  3.64  -2.995  -2.730  -2.992  -2.714 
                    
 
 
Table 9: Unit value gap by tariff rate. 
Country  Unit Value Gap 
  Tariff below median 
(1)  
Tariff above median 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
0.15 0.43 0.27  Bulgaria 
(1713 products)  (1700 products)    
          
0.18 0.25 0.07  Czech Republic 
(9283 products)  (6065 products)    
          
0.14 0.23 0.09  Hungary  
 (11129 products)  (10720 products)    
          
-5.90 -5.70 0.20  Latvia 
(7940 products)  (4918 products)    
          
0.19 0.35 0.15  Lithuania 
(6639 products)  (2438 products)    
          
-0.20 -0.80 -0.60  Poland 
(12636 products)  (4873 products)    
          
0.25 0.46 0.20  Romania 
(5114 products)  (3312 products)    
          
-5.29 -5.20 0.10  Russian Federation 
(9625 products)  (6495 products)    
          
0.08 0.30 0.22 
Slovenia 
(7642 products)  (2655 products)    
          
-3.01 -2.45 0.56 
Ukraine 
(6820 products)  (4711 products)    
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In the absence of evasion, we would expect the unit value gap to be negative, as import statistics 
include the cost of freight and insurance, neither of which is captured by the export data. However, as 
indicated in Table 8, in 6 out of 10 countries the average unit value gap is positive. It is even more 
striking that in all countries, the average unit value gap is larger for differentiated products. This is true 
for both the conservative and the liberal definition of differentiated products. Further, Table 9 suggests 
that in all but one country (Poland) the unit value gap is larger for products with the above median tariff 
rate.  
To test this relationship more formally, we regress the unit value gap on the tariff rate, 
differentiated product dummy and the interaction between the two variables. To save space, we present 
only the specification estimated with country-year and product fixed effects and the specification in first 
differences. We restrict our attention to the sample excluding agricultural products.
11 
 
Table 10: Unit value gap. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Levels  First  differences 
Tariff  0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.003  -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)*  (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
         
 0.002     0.012    Tariff*Conservative dummy 
 (0.001)*     (0.005)**   
           
   0.003    0.010  Tariff*liberal dummy 
   (0.001)**    (0.005)** 
          
Country-year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
Product  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
Country fixed effects  No  No  No   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Agricultural  products  Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
          
Observations  121963 121963 121963  94658  94658  94658 
Adjusted R-squared  0.66 0.66 0.66  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002 
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
As evident in Table 10, we find no evidence of price misrepresentation (i.e., reporting unit values 
of imports as being lower than what they really are) being responsive to the tariff rate in general. On the 
contrary, in one case we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the tariff rate. However, 
we do find evidence suggesting that price misrepresentation is positively correlated with the tariff rate in 
the case of differentiated products. The results suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the tariff 
                                                 
11 Including agricultural products in the sample would not change the conclusions of this study.   20
rate is associated with a 0.2% increase in the unit value gap. When we estimate a model in first 
differences, we confirm these findings and find an even larger effect: a one-percentage-point increase in 
the tariff rate is associated with a 1.2% increase in the value gap. The estimated coefficient is significant 
at the 5% level. 
 
5.2 Undercounting quantities of imported products 
Next we turn to another potential channel of tariff evasion, namely undercounting the quantities 
of imports, and we calculate the difference between the quantity of exports reported by Germany and the 
quantity of imports recorded by the importing country.  
The summary statistics presented in Table 11 suggests that this channel of tariff evasion is much 
less prevalent. In 9 out of 10 countries, the quantity gap is negative suggesting that the quantities recorded 
by the importing country are larger than those recorded by Germany. The negative value is consistent 
with the stylized fact that countries tend to monitor their imports more carefully than exports.  
 
Table 11: Quantity gap. Homogeneous versus differentiated products. 
   Homogeneous  Differentiated  Homogeneous  Differentiated 
  
Mean   St. Dev 
Conservative Liberal 
                  
Bulgaria -0.18  1.53  0.119  -0.273  0.104  -0.294 
Czech Republic  -0.07  1.34  0.125  -0.159  0.082  -0.157 
Hungary   -0.13  1.52  0.024  -0.188  0.007  -0.195 
Latvia -0.14  1.55  0.000 -0.178  -0.027  -0.181 
Lithuania -0.33  1.49  -0.202 -0.370 -0.219 -0.375 
Poland -0.04  0.98  0.032  -0.056  -0.014  -0.044 
Romania -0.38  1.63  -0.076  -0.488  -0.112  -0.502 
Russian Federation  -0.21  1.70 -0.184  -0.216  -0.190  -0.216 
Slovenia 0.01  1.59  0.263 -0.078 0.239 -0.093 
Ukraine -0.12  1.73  0.052  -0.162  0.045  -0.174 
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Table 12: Quantity gap by tariff rate. 
Country Quantity  Gap 
  
Tariff below median  
(1) 
Tariff above median 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) - (1) 
-0.17 -0.20 -0.02  Bulgaria 
 (1713 products)  (1700 products)    
          
-0.08 -0.06 0.02  Czech 
Republic  (9283 products)  (6065 products)    
          
-0.18 -0.08 0.10  Hungary  
(11129 products)  (10720 products)    
          
-0.16 -0.12 0.04  Latvia 
(7940 products)  (4918 products)    
          
-0.33 -0.34 -0.01  Lithuania 
(6639 products)  (2438 products)    
          
-0.05 0.00 0.05  Poland 
(12636 products)   (4873 products)    
          
-0.37 -0.40 -0.03  Romania 
(5114 products)  (3312 products)    
          
-0.31 -0.06 0.24  Russian 
Federation  (9625 products)  (6495 products)    
          
0.07 -0.15 -0.22  Slovenia 
(7642 products)  (2655 products)    
          
-0.18 -0.03 0.15  Ukraine 
(6820 products)  (4711 products)    
 
While the quantity gap is always negative for differentiated products, it is positive in the majority 
of countries when homogeneous products are considered. This is true in 7 out of 10 countries in the case 
of the conservative definition and in 5 out of 10 countries in the case of the liberal definition. It is may be 
easier to undercount quantities of homogeneous goods as they tend to be sold by weight rather than by 
piece. As expected, the quantity gap is larger for products with the above median tariff. This is true in 6 
out of 10 countries considered (see Table 12). 
When we repeat our econometric exercise with the quantity gap as the dependent variable, we 
find little support for undercounting being a major channel of tariff evasion. While the model in levels 
produces positive coefficients on the tariff rate as well as on its interaction with the differentiated product 
dummy, both coefficients lose their significance in a first difference specification (Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Quantity gap. Homogeneous versus differentiated products.   22
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Levels  First  differences 
Tariff  0.007 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*  (0.001)*** (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
           
 0.012       -0.001    Tariff*Conservative dummy 
 (0.001)***       (0.002)   
           
  0.01    -0.001  Tariff*liberal dummy 
  (0.001)***    (0.002) 
        
Country-year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  No  No  No 
Product  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes  No  No  No 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Agricultural  products  Excluded Excluded Excluded  Excluded Excluded Excluded 
         
Observations  121963 121963 121963  94658  94658  94658 
Adjusted R-squared  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 
        
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
**** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
5.3 Misclassification of imported products 
Finally, we turn to misclassification of products as another potential channel of tariff evasion. We 
follow Fisman and Wei (2004) and include in our basic specification an additional regressor–the average 
tariff on similar products which are defined as all other 6-digit products belonging to the same 4-digit HS 
category. The average is weighted by the share of each product in German exports within each 4-digit HS 
category.
12 This additional regressor enters the estimated equation by itself as well as in interaction with 
the differentiated product dummy. If misclassification takes place, we expect to see a negative coefficient 
on the tariff on similar products, which would signify that holding the own tariff rate constant, a lower 
tariff on similar products creates more opportunities for misreporting. If such misclassification is easier 
for differentiated products, we would expect the coefficient on the interaction term to bear a negative 
sign. 
Table 14: Results with tariffs on similar products.      
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Levels  First  differences 
Tariff  0.006 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.001)***  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
          
Tariff on similar products  0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
                                                 
12 The summary statistics for each importing country are presented in Appendix I Table A3. 
Note that using an unweighted average would lead to similar conclusions.   23
        
Tariff*Conservative  dummy   0.013    0.01   
   (0.003)***    (0.008)   
        
Tariff on similar products    0.002      0.000   
*Conservative  dummy   (0.003)    (0.008)   
        
Tariff*Liberal  dummy    0.013    0.011 
    (0.003)***    (0.008) 
        
Tariff on similar products       0.000      -0.004 
*Liberal  dummy    (0.003)    (0.008) 
        
Country-year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
Product  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Agricultural  products  Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
        
Observations  123857 123857 123857 95509  95509  95509 
Adjusted R-squared  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.00  0.0001  0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Tariff on similar products is defined as the weighted tariff on all other 6-digit 
products belonging to the same 4-digit category. Weights are equal to product export shares within the 4-digit category. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
In contrast to the findings of Fisman and Wei, we do not find that misclassification (at least 
within the same 4-digit HS category) is prevalent in transition countries. As can be seen in Table 14, tariff 
on similar products does not appear to be statistically significant in any specification. Neither does its 
interaction with the differentiated product dummy. Our basic result, suggesting that elasticity of missing 
trade is larger for differentiated products, remains unchanged in the specification in levels. The overall 
responsiveness of missing trade to the tariff rate, however, retains its significance in only one 
specification. These changes in results are most likely due to a high correlation between own tariff rate 
and the tariff rate on similar products (0.86).  
The lack of evidence on misclassification may be attributed to high correlation between own tariff 
and tariff on similar products or to the possibility that misclassification takes place outside the same 4-
digit category. For example, when in 2000 Johnson & Johnson was importing to Russia their “2-in-1 
Shower Gel” the company categorized it as a soap substitute, but customs decided to consider the product 
as a cosmetic and the company had to pay a 20% instead of a 15% duty (Aris, 2000). While soap is 
included in the 3401 HS category (HS 340120 is “soap in other forms”), cosmetics belong to HS 3304 
(“beauty, make-up, skin-care, nes”). 
In sum, our analysis suggests that differentiated products may lend themselves more easily to 
tariff evasion and that such evasion is likely to take place through misrepresentation of product prices 
rather than undercounting of physical quantities or misclassifying products.   24
6. Conclusions 
An emerging literature building on Rauch’s (1999) paper has demonstrated some unique 
characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature on differentiated 
products by postulating that such products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties 
associated with assessing the quality and thus the price of such products, which creates greater scope for 
tariff evasion on the part of importers and corrupt customs officials.  
Using product-level data on German exports to 10 Eastern European countries we demonstrate 
empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the positive discrepancy 
between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by an 
Eastern European importer, is positively correlated with the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries, thus 
generalizing the result of Fisman and Wei (2004) found for China. Further, we demonstrate that the 
responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for 
homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.6% increase 
in trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 2.1% increase in the case of differentiated 
products. Finally, our results indicate that the greater tariff evasion observed for differentiated products 
tends to take place through misrepresentation of the import price. 
While our study does not explicitly focus on the effects of customs reform, its findings suggest 
that limiting discretion of customs officials, introducing systems allowing for verification of import 
documents or price comparisons with similar products and introducing effective audits of customs 
officials are likely to lower tariff evasion. Our results also provide evidence in favor of having a uniform 
tariff structure which would dampen the incentives and the ability to misclassify imported products. 
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Appendix I 
 
The data coverage for individual countries is as follows: 
Bulgaria: 2001-2002; Czech Republic: 1996-2001; Hungary: 1992-2001; Latvia: 1996-2003; Lithuania: 
1995-2000; Poland: 1994-2003; Romania: 1999-2003; Slovenia: 1999-2003; Russian Federation: 1996-
2003; Ukraine: 1996-2002. 
 
Tariff data are not available for all years. In case of missing data we keep the tax rate constant until a new 
tariff rate is available. We fill in the tax rates for a maximum of three periods. 
 
In the WITS database, Hungarian imports are reported only if the value is above US$1000. In order to 
keep a similar structure, we drop all the exports from Germany whose value is below this threshold. A 
similar problem arises for Poland. No imports below US$50,000 are reported by Poland. We apply the 
same strategy as before by dropping all the exports from Germany whose value is below this cutoff.    28
 
Table A1: Average tariff rate in the first and last year  
Country Tariff  rates 
  First year  Last year  Difference 
      
  (1)  (2)  (2) - (1) 
Bulgaria 3.91  4.01  0.10 
  (1706 products)  (1747 products)   
      
Czech Republic  6.25  2.09  -4.15 
  (2785 products)   (2612 products)   
      
Hungary   12.94  5.55  -7.39 
  (2282 products)   (2193 products)    
      
Latvia 3.98  3.43  -0.54 
  (1433 products)   (1753 products)    
      
Lithuania 3.92  3.54  -0.38 
  (1537 products)  (1775 products)    
      
Poland 11.78  1.90  -9.88 
  (1784 products)   (1756 products)    
      
Romania 8.37  6.49  -1.88 
  (1929 products)   (2013 products)    
      
Russian Federation  12.08  10.35  -1.73 
  (2073 products)   (1791 products)    
      
Slovenia 10.69  0.74  -9.95 
  (2188 products)   (2061 products)    
      
Ukraine 7.86  7.81  -0.05 
   (1756 products)   (1616 products)     
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Table A2: Average share of imports from Germany on total imports 
  
Avg. share of imports from Germany on total imports 
  
Bulgaria 15% 











Table A3: Summary statistics for tariff on similar products 
Country Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum Maximum  Obs. 
       
Bulgaria 3.31  6.19  0  67  3453 
Czech Republic  3.98  5.99  0  138  15956 
Hungary   7.78  10.72  0  150  21810 
Latvia 4.25  6.86  0  75  11754 
Lithuania 3.42  6.99  0  70  9927 
Poland 4.46  12.50  0  295  17130 
Romania 6.33  8.44  0  98  9694 
Russian Federation  11.52  8.18  0  100  16243 
Slovenia 6.23  7.02  0  45  10367 
Ukraine 8.06  8.85  0  50  11682   30
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Responsiveness of evasion gap to tariff
Linear (Responsiveness of evasion gap to tariff)
 
Notes: Responsiveness of trade gap to tariff is equal to the coefficient estimated in Table 4. Statistically insignificant 
coefficients are set to zero. BEEPS corruption is defined as the percentage of firms reporting that "additional 
payments" are made “always,” “usually” or “frequently” when dealing with customs and imports. It is the average 
value for the 1999 and 2002 wave of the survey. 
 
The exact questions used in the survey were as follows: 
 
“How frequently do firms in your line of business have to pay some irregular "additional payments" to 
deal with customs and imports?” (1999 survey) 
 
“Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make in a given year, could you 
please tell me how often would they make payments/gifts to deal with customs and import” (2002 survey) 
 
The possible answers were: always, usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never. 